Introduction
Economic experiments on strategic games typically generate data that, in early rounds, violate standard equilibrium predictions. However, subjects normally change their behavior over time in response to experience. The study of learning in games is about how this behavioral change works empirically. This empirical investigation also has a theoretical payoff: If subjects' behavior converges to an equilibrium, the underlying learning model becomes a theory of equilibration. In games with multiple equilibria, this same model can also serve as a theory of equilibrium selection, a long-standing challenge for theorists.
There are two general approaches to studying learning: Population models and individual models.
1. Population models make predictions about how the aggregate behavior in a population will change as a result of aggregate experience. For example, in replicator dynamics, a population's propensity to play a certain strategy will depend on its 'fitness' (payoff) relative to the mixture of strategies played previously (Friedman, 1991; Weibull, 1995) . Models like this submerge differences in individual learning paths.
2. Individual learning models allow each person to choose differently, depending on the experiences each person has. For example, in Cournot dynamics, subjects form a belief that other players will always repeat their most recent choice and bestrespond accordingly.
1 Since players are matched with different opponents, their best responses vary across the population. Aggregate behavior in the population can be obtained by summing individual paths of learning.
This chapter reviews three major approaches to individual learning in games: experienceweighted attraction (EWA) learning, reinforcement learning, and belief learning (includ-ing Cournot and fictitious play). 2 These models of learning strive to explain, for every choice in an experiment, how that choice arose from players' previous behavior and experience. These models assume strategies have numerical evaluations, which are called "attractions." Learning rules are defined by how attractions are updated in response to experience. Attractions are then mapped into predicted choice probabilities for strategies using some well-known statistical rule (such as logit).
The three major approaches to learning assume players are adaptive (i.e., they respond only to their own previous experience and ignore others' payoff information) and that their behavior is not sensitive to the way in which players are matched. Empirical evidence suggests otherwise. There are subjects who can anticipate how others learn and choose actions to influence others' path of learning in order to benefit themselves.
So, we describe a generalization of these adaptive learning models to allow this kind of sophisticated behavior. This generalized model assumes that there is a mixture of adaptive learners and sophisticated players. An adaptive learner adjusts his behavior according to one of the above learning rules. A sophisticated player does not learn and rationally best-responds to his forecast of others' learning behavior. This model therefore allows "one-stop shopping" for investigating the various statistical comparisons of learning and equilibrium models.
EWA Learning
Denote player i's jth strategy by s 
where indicator variable I(x, y) is 1 if x = y and 0 otherwise. The experience weight is updated by:
and N (t) approaches the steady-state value of
. If N (0) begins below this value, it steadily rises, capturing an increase in the weight placed on previous attractions and a (relative) decrease in the impact of recent observations, so that learning slows down.
Attractions are mapped into choice probabilities using a logit rule (other functional forms fit about equally well; Camerer and Ho, 1998):
where λ is the payoff sensitivity parameter. The key parameters are δ, φ, and κ (which are generally assumed to be in the [0,1] interval).
The most important parameter, δ, is the weight on foregone payoffs relative to realized payoffs. It can be interpreted as a kind of "imagination" of foregone payoffs, or responsiveness to foregone payoffs (when δ is larger players move more strongly toward ex post best responses). We call it "consideration" of foregone payoffs. The weight on foregone payoff δ is also an intuitive way to formalize the "learning direction" theory of Selten and Stoecker (1986) . Their theory consists of an appealing property of learning:
Subject move in the direction of ex-post best-response. Broad applicability of the theory has been hindered by defining "direction" only in terms of numerical properties of ordered strategies (e.g., choosing 'higher prices' if the ex-post best response is a higher price than the chosen price). The parameter δ defines the "direction" of learning set-theoretically by shifting probability toward the set of strategies with higher payoffs than the chosen ones.
The parameter φ is naturally interpreted as depreciation of past attractions, A j i (t−1). In a game-theoretic context, φ will be affected by the degree to which players realize other players are adapting, so that old observations on what others did become less and less useful. So we can interpret φ as an index of (perceived) "change" in the environment.
The parameter κ determines the growth rate of attractions, which in turn affects how sharply players converge. When κ = 0, the attractions are weighted averages of lagged attractions and payoff reinforcements (with weights φ · N (t − 1)/(φ · N (t − 1) + 1) and 1/(φ·N (t−1)+1). When κ = 1 and N (t) = 1, the attractions are cumulations of previous reinforcements rather than averages (i.e., A
. In the logit model, the differences in strategy attractions determine their choice probabilities. When κ is high the attractions can grow furthest apart over time, making choice probabilities closer to zero and one. We therefore interpret κ as an index of "commitment".
Reinforcement Learning
In cumulative reinforcement learning (Harley, 1981; Roth and Erev, 1995) , strategies have levels of attraction which are incremented by only received payoffs. The initial reinforcement level of strategy j of player i, s j i , is R j i (0). Reinforcements are updated as follows:
Using the indicator function, the two equations can be reduced to one:
This updating formula is a special case of the EWA rule, when δ = 0, N (0) = 1, and
In average reinforcement learning, updated attractions are averages of previous attractions and received payoffs (e.g. Mookerjhee and Sopher, 1994, 1997; Erev and Roth, 1998 ). For example
A little algebra shows that this updating formula is also a special case of the EWA rule, when δ = 0, N (0) = 1 1−φ , and κ = 0. Since the two reinforcement models are special cases of EWA learning, their predictive adequacy can be tested empirically by setting the appropriate EWA parameters to their restricted values and seeing how much fit is compromised (adjusting, of course, for degrees of freedom).
Belief Learning
In belief-based models, adaptive players base their responses on beliefs formed by observing their opponents' past plays. While there are many ways of forming beliefs, we consider a fairly general "weighted fictitious play" model, which includes fictitious play (Brown, 1951; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998 ) and Cournot best-response (Cournot, 1960) as special cases. It corresponds to bayesian learning if players have a Dirichlet prior belief.
3
In weighted fictitious play, players begin with prior beliefs about what the other players will do, which are expressed as ratios of strategy choice counts to the total experience. Denote total experience by N (t) = k N k −i (t). Express the belief that others will play strategy k as B
Beliefs are updated by depreciating the previous counts by φ, and adding one for the strategy combination actually chosen by the other players. That is,
.
(4.1) the most recent observation, so φ can be interpreted as how quickly previous experience is discarded. When φ = 0 players weight only the most recent observation (Cournot dynamics); when φ = 1 all previous observations count equally (fictitious play).
Given these beliefs, we can compute expected payoffs in each period t,
The crucial step is to express period t expected payoffs as a function of period t − 1 expected payoffs. This yields:
By expressing expected payoffs as a function of lagged expected payoffs, we make the belief terms disappear. This is because the beliefs are only used to compute expected payoffs, and when beliefs are formed according to weighted fictitious play, the expected payoffs which result can also be generated by generalized reinforcement according to previous payoffs. More precisely, if the initial attractions in the EWA model are expected payoffs given some initial beliefs (i.e., A j i (0) = E j i (0)), κ = 0 (or φ = ρ), and foregone payoffs are weighted as strongly as received payoffs (δ = 1), then EWA attractions are exactly the same as expected payoffs. Put differently, belief learning is "mathematically equivalent" or "observationally equivalent" to EWA learning with δ = 1, κ = 0 and
This demonstrates a close kinship between reinforcement and belief approaches. Belief learning is nothing more than generalized attraction learning in which strategies are reinforced equally strongly by actual payoffs and foregone payoffs and attractions are weighted averages of past attractions and reinforcements. Since reinforcement and belief learning are special cases of EWA learning, it is possible to represent all three learning models in a three-dimensional EWA cube (see Figure   1 ). The vertex δ = 1 and κ = 0 corresponds, to weighted fictitious play models. The The cube shows that contrary to popular belief for many decades, reinforcement and belief learning are simply two extreme configurations on opposite edges of a threedimensional cube, rather than fundamentally unrelated models. Figure 1 also shows estimates of the three parameters in 20 different studies (Camerer, Ho, and Chong, 2002) . Each point is a triple of estimates.
5 Most points are sprinkled throughout the cube, rather than at the extreme vertices mentioned in the previous paragraph, although some (generally from games with mixed-strategy equilibria) are near the averaged reinforcement corner δ = 0 and κ = φ = 1. 6 Parameter estimates are generally significantly inside the interior of the cube, rather than near the vertices. Thus, we may conclude that subjects' behavior is often neither belief nor reinforcement learning. 7 The cube shows which games these nested approaches fail and why.
5 These parameter estimates were typically obtained by the maximum likelihood method. Initial attractions could be either estimated using data or set to plausible values using the cognitive hierarchy model of one-shot games (see Camerer, Ho, and Chong, 2004 ). 6 Ho, Camerer, and Chong (in press) provide an explanation for how δ and φ vary across games by endogenizing them as functions of game experience. This self-tuning approach provides a one-parameter model, which makes EWA learning more amenable to field applications. 7 Players are assumed to have the same learning parameters. Allowing for heterogeneity often improves fit. However, the population is not simply a mixture of reinforcement and belief learning. In fact, such a mixture is significantly worse than a mixture of two types of EWA learners in predictive performance ).
Linking Learning and Equilibrium Models
The adaptive learning models presented above do not permit players to anticipate learn- Formally, adaptive learners follow the EWA updating equations given above (i.e., (2.1) and (2.2)). Sophisticated players have attractions B j i (t) and choice probabilities Q j i (t + 1) specified as follows:
2)
The generalized model has been applied to experimental data from 10-period p-beauty contest games (Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt, 1998) . In these games, seven subjects choose numbers in [0,100] simultaneously. The subject whose number is closest to p times the average (where p = .7 or .9) wins a fixed prize. Subjects playing for the first time are called "inexperienced"; those playing another 10-period game (with a different p) are called "experienced". Table 1 The increase in sophistication due to experience reflects a kind of "learning about learning," which is similar to rule learning (i.e., subjects switch their learning rule over time) (Stahl, 2000 ). Figure 2b shows that cumulative reinforcement model learns far too slowly because only one player wins each period and the losers get no reinforcement. Figure 2c shows that belief models with low values of φ update beliefs very quickly but do not capture anticipatory learning, in which some 8 There is also an empirical question of whether learning parameters should be the same across games.
For prediction, it is best if parameters are stable and universal across games, but that is unlikely to be true if the parameters reflect behavioral tendencies that respond to changes in games. The challenge is then to model how the "self-tuning" change occurs (see Ho, Camerer, and Chong, in press). subjects anticipate others are learning, best-respond, and leapfrog ahead. As a result, the frequency of low choices (1-10) predicted by belief learning only grows from 20% in period 5 to 35% in period 10, while the actual frequencies grow from 40% to 55%. Similarly, EWA learning is not able to capture the fast equilibration of experienced subjects ( Figure   2d ). Adding sophistication (Figure 2e ) captures the actual frequencies quite closely.
Conclusions
We describe three major approaches of adaptive learning models. We show that EWA learning is a generalization of reinforcement and belief learning and that the latter two nested models are intimately related. Specifically, they differ mainly in the way they treat foregone payoffs; reinforcement learning ignores them and belief learning treats them the same as actual payoffs. Estimation results from dozens of studies show that the emergence of behavior is neither reinforcement nor belief learning in most games. The EWA cube provides a simple way for detecting how these simpler models fail and why.
We also describe a generalization of these adaptive models to study anticipation by some players that others are learning. This generalized model nests equilibrium and the adaptive learning models as special cases and is a powerful framework for analyzing both equilibrium and learning simultaneously. We show that it can improve the predictive performance of the adaptive learning models when players are experienced and able to anticipate how others learn.
